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International Investment Law’s Unending
Legitimation Project
“Power proves its legitimacy. . . .”
François Guizot (1851)

David Schneiderman*
Legitimacy problems continue to dog investment law, despite modest
efforts at bridging its legitimacy gap. Drawing upon lectures by
nineteenth century historian François Guizot, this Article argues that
legitimacy problems do not simply dissipate over time. Securing and
maintaining legitimacy, instead, requires continuous work. This Article
takes up a justificatory frame for determining how well investment law is
succeeding in securing legitimacy. As Guizot describes it, representatives
invested with power on behalf of a majority must continually seek to
justify their authority. Because rulers are fallible, exercises of authority
must be open, public, and subject to endless questioning. The subsequent
parts of the Article evaluate strategies that have been taken up by states
and by arbitrators in light of this legitimacy frame. The Article asks
whether these strategies offer up a means by which citizens can learn
about, embrace, or resist the regime’s dictates of what is in the common
interest. It is suggested that the state and arbitral strategies under
discussion fall far short of this mark. More drastic reforms need to be
entertained, many of which will be anathema to investment law’s norm
entrepreneurs.
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INTRODUCTION
International investment law overflows with legitimacy talk. Consider
the role of legitimacy in the context of an expropriation claim. Only
“legitimate regulatory responses” will absolve states of the responsibility
to provide just compensation.1 This is codified in annexes to post-2004
United States and Canadian bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”). Laws
intended to “protect legitimate public welfare objectives” will, only in
“rare circumstances,” give rise to an obligation to pay compensation.2
Consider, too, the rise of “legitimate expectations” doctrine under fair
and equitable treatment (“FET”) doctrine. Tribunals have been
preoccupied with what expectations might be considered “legitimate,”
demanding specific representations in some cases3 or looking to
generalized expectations laid down in regulatory frameworks in others.4
1. See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.22 (Aug. 20, 2007) (finding that the provincial
authorities of Tucumán violated the fair and equitable standard of the bilateral investment treaty);
see also Allen S. Weiner, Indirect Expropriations: The Need for a Taxonomy of “Legitimate”
Regulatory Purposes, 5 INT’L L. F. 166 (2003) (discussing the relevancy of regulatory purposes in
determining whether an indirect expropriation has taken place).
2. The Model Canadian Annex provides, for greater certainty, that non-discriminatory measures
intended to “protect legitimate” objectives associated with health, safety, welfare, and the
environment are not indirect expropriations. See infra Part III (discussing arbitral strategies).
3. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003) (considering whether environmental and health
protections are legitimate and warrant a denial to operate a landfill); see also Clayton v. Canada,
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability
(Mar. 17, 2015) (alleging that there were in fact legitimate expectations by investors when Nova
Scotia officials encouraged investing in a quarry in the area).
4. See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award (May 12, 2005) (alleging that the legal and regulatory framework governing the license
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Legitimacy also is conscripted to justify elevating investor protections to
the level of international law. National political processes are described
as insufficiently dedicated to the interests of foreign investors and,
therefore, illegitimate as foreign investors are not represented within the
host state political institutions.5 Local courts, too, are considered
unreliable respecters of rights because, in the words of the Clayton
tribunal, they do not offer “independence and detachment from domestic
pressures.”6
Lastly, there are claims that there is an ongoing “legitimacy crisis” in
investment arbitration.7 Legitimacy is in doubt not only with respect to
the method for resolving investment disputes (investor-state dispute
settlement or “ISDS”), but also with respect to the standards of protection
available to investors—a sword with which investors are entitled to
challenge all variety of legislative and policy prescriptions. As interpreted
by investment tribunals, standards appear to be ever expanding and
continually evolving.8 They exhibit little deference to local administrative
or legislative processes9 and exceed the domestic public law protections of
even developed states.10 They are intended, instead, to significantly dampen
state policy space11 beyond what is ordinarily deemed acceptable by the

provides for the right of the licensee to a fair and reasonable tariff); see also BG Group Public
Limited Company v. Argentine Republic, Final Award (UNCITRAL Arb., Dec. 24, 2007)
(similarly discussing whether the regulatory framework provides a licensee the right to tariffs
collected from the services they provided).
5. See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (noting the
duty to protect foreign investments); see also David Schneiderman, Investing in Democracy?
Political Process Review and International Investment Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 909 (2010)
(noting that it has been claimed that the interests of foreign investors ordinarily will not be
represented within a host state’s political processes).
6. Clayton v. Canada, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 439 (Mar. 17, 2015).
7. For a representative view of this claim by a member of the arbitration bar, see Devashish
Krishan, Thinking About BITs and BIT Arbitration: The Legitimacy Crisis That Never Was, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 107 (Todd
Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011).
8. Frederico Ortino, Substantive Provisions, in IIAs and Future Treaty-Making: Addressing
Three Challenges, E15 TASK FORCE ON INVESTMENT POLICY (2015).
9. GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN RESTRAINTS: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 74–75 (2013) (noting that arbitrators show
little interest in deferring to democratic processes).
10. See, e.g., Lise Johnson and Oleksander Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State
“Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 406
(2013) (noting a clear divergence between the two). This issue is further discussed infra Part I.B.
11. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 125 (2015).
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legal systems of capital-exporting states.12 That there are legitimacy
problems will be denied by some operating within the system. Judge Stephen
Schwebel, for one, claims that criticisms giving rise to legitimacy concerns
are “more colorful than they are cogent.”13 Denigrating critics of
investment law seems to be a common reflex for this set of actors.14
Yet there is little doubt that the investment treaty regime faces a
legitimacy deficit, if not a legitimacy crisis. 15 The proliferation of
complaints, channeled via media representations casting doubt on the
legitimacy of ISDS or states and sub-regional units expressing doubt
about the utility of ISDS, give voice to legitimacy concerns that are not
well-addressed by the system’s norm entrepreneurs.16 This has prompted
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTAD”), which aggressively promoted the regime, to go so far as
to declare that investment law is “at a crossroads.”17 The question for
UNCTAD is not whether to reform, but the direction reform will take.18
The object of this Article is to examine the “invisible institution” of
legitimacy within the context of investment law.19 Thoughtful discussion
in this context has already been undertaken. Much of this literature,
however, is preoccupied with restoring, or propping up, legitimacy. This
literature adopts an internal perspective—advocating, for instance, for
more consistency and coherence in arbitral decisionmaking.20 This
12. As argued below. See infra notes 11722 (analyzing the rights afforded to foreign
investors).
13. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, Keynote Address: In Defence of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
in LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 6 (Albert J. van den Berg ed., 2015).
14. E.g., The Honorable Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth
About Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (2014) (discussing alleged mistruths promoted by international
investment law critics). I discuss examples of this anger in David Schneiderman, The Paranoid
Style of Investment Lawyers and Arbitrators: Investment Law Norm Entrepreneurs and Their
Critics, in ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 131 (C. L. Lim ed., 2016).
15. Or at the least a public relations problem. On the concept of legitimacy deficit, see Rüdiger
Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory
Considerations, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 5 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben
eds., 2008).
16. These are canvassed in Schneiderman, supra note 14.
17. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 170–71.
18. Id. at 171.
19. The quoted phrase is from PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY:
IMPARTIALITY, REFLEXIVITY, PROXIMITY 89 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2011).
20. E.g., Jürgen Kurtz, Building Legitimacy Through Interpretation in Investor-State
Arbitration: On Consistency, Coherence and the Identification of Applicable Law, in THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 257
(Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014); Charles H. Brower II,
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Article takes a different approach. First, it is not motivated by a desire to
restore legitimacy. It offers an internal account only to the extent that it
evaluates strategies adopted by some of the system’s principal actors,
namely, states and arbitrators.21 Second, the Article offers an external
account insofar as strategies of legitimation are evaluated in light of
legitimacy as a form of public reasoning about the common good. This is
a perspective that is, for the most part, external to investment law’s
rationality. The Article also offers a distinctive perspective, as it treats
legitimacy in modern polities as necessitating not only its initial
realization, but also its continued maintenance.
Much of the legitimacy debate, too often preoccupied with correct
legal processes or with state consent, elides the likelihood that legitimacy
problems will not simply go away. They may dissipate, but such
questions are never likely to be settled once and for all. This is because,
in democratic societies, power, once conferred, must continually
legitimize itself. This is a proposition advanced by the nineteenth century
French historian François Guizot, the first systematic interpreter of
government in the modern age.22 “As soon as the capacity [for power] is
presumed or proved, it is placed in a position where it is open to a kind
of legal suspicion, and where it must necessarily continue to legitimize
itself, in order to retain its power,” Guizot declared.23 Legitimacy, from
this angle, will remain precarious and, in the words of Guizot’s modern
interpreter, Pierre Rosanvallon, “always open to challenge.” In other
words, legitimacy concerns—though not always rising to the level of
“crisis”—will continue to dog the regime. This will not end when
Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (2003)
(arguing that the commercial arbitration model has generated incoherent doctrine); William W.
Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the
ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 199 (2008) (discussing the
jurisprudence as deeply problematic); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1521 (2005) (discussing the uncertainty generated by investment arbitration).
21. The internal perspective is limited to discerning strategies that are revealing of
“standards . . . actors actually use in assessing” their own legitimacy. It is about inferring views
about legitimacy “from the arguments actors make.” Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International
Law and International Relations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 332, 335 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack eds., 2013).
22. PIERRE ROSANVALLON, LE BON GOUVERNEMENT 282 (2015).
23. FRANÇOIS GUIZOT, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN
EUROPE 62 (Andrew M. Scobie trans., 2002). Regarding Guizot’s fallibilist and meritocratic
response to the French Revolution, see CLAUDE LEFORT, WRITING: THE POLITICAL TEST 85108
(French Ministry of Culture trans., 2000); PIERRE ROSANVALLON, DEMOCRACY PAST AND
FUTURE 11726 (Samuel Moyn ed., 2006).
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investment law’s norms are internalized within host state national law, as
is hoped for by the system’s promoters.24
In what follows, I first take up selective explanations of law’s
legitimacy (Part I). There is a vast extant literature on legitimacy, but
helpful accounts identify multiple factors—a mix of the descriptive and
the normative together with input- and output-oriented strategies25—that
are associated with legitimate legal orders. 26 Three different
understandings of legitimacy are examined in order to foreground the
discussion of strategies taken up by states (Part II) and then by arbitrators
(Part III). As the Article’s preferred understanding of legitimacy appeals
to normatively desirable, but contingent, ends having to do with
promotion of the common good, the object in Part II and Part III is to
inquire into proposed strategies in light of this legitimacy frame. To be
sure, there are well-founded concerns about the ways in which legitimacy
discourse serves only to naturalize already existing forms of authority.27
The discussion aims not to naturalize, but to scrutinize, strategies adopted
by relevant actors that can be seen as a response to legitimacy concerns.
The Article concludes with predictions about where this debate may lead.
I. THREE UNDERSTANDINGS OF LEGITIMACY
This Part takes up three ways of looking at legal legitimacy. 28 All three
draw upon conceptions of legitimacy arising out of national political
24. E.g., Michael Hart & William Dymond, NAFTA Chapter 11: Precedents, Principles, and
Prospects, in WHOSE RIGHTS? THE NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DEBATE 128, 168 (Laura Ritchie Dawson
ed., 2002); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92
AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 639 (1998) (advocating for a more liberal investment regime).
25. Scharpf describes input-oriented thought as “by the people” (associated with J.J. Rousseau)
and output-oriented thought as “for the people” (associated with the Federalist Papers). FRITZ W.
SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 67 (1999). On the need for
the presence of each in global legal production, see Anne Peters, Dual Democracy, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 263, 340 (2009).
26. E.g., Bodansky, supra note 21, at 331 (discussing normative legitimacy); JUTTA BRUNNÉE
& STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL
ACCOUNT 5255 (2010) (discussing the role of legitimacy in the construction of international law);
Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 40537 (2006) (noting that legitimacy requires both the right to rule and
belief that the institution has the right to rule).
27. By saying ‘legitimacy’ as often as possible and in connection with as many and as
controversial political actions as possible, actions that cannot be seriously discussed in terms
of their lawfulness or moral substance, receive a sense of acceptability and naturalness that
is precisely the function of the ideology to attain.
Martti Koskenniemi, Legitimacy, Rights, and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New
Moral Internationalism, 7 ASS’NS: J. FOR LEGAL & SOC. THEORY 349, 368 (2003).
28. For a survey of taxonomies, see Christopher A. Thomas, The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy
in International Law, 34 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 729 (2014).
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experiences. Concern has been expressed that such accounts do not
translate well beyond national states—that they set too high a bar for
transnational legal orders to secure and maintain legitimacy. For this
reason, J.H.H. Weiler calls for “an altogether new discourse of
legitimacy” to vindicate contemporary modes of international
governance.29 To be sure, there can be no simple translation of the
mechanisms of legitimacy from the national to transnational levels. This
will prove difficult, if not impossible, to achieve until such time as a
viable global democracy, and accompanying global public sphere, is
secured. National experiences, nevertheless, will continue to be relevant
to such discussions,30 the more so that transnational legal rules and
institutions supplant functions formerly served by states.31 This heightens
legitimacy concerns that may be experienced by investment law in
addition to other international legal orders. National experiences offer
critical evidence of how legitimacy has been secured, or has failed to be
secured, in the past. If some would prefer not setting too high a bar for
global legal norms and institutions, we should also avoid generating
criteria that legitimacy-deprived supra-national legal orders can easily
exceed. Instead, the bar should be set high enough to satisfy, legally and
politically, the burden of exercising what is commonly understood as
legitimate authority.32
A. Legitimacy as Legality
This first understanding treats legitimacy as equivalent to legality. This
positivistic understanding—that following correct legal processes gives
rise to legitimate law—typically is traced to Max Weber’s multiple
mentions of legitimacy in the sociological treatise Economy and Society.
Legitimacy rested, he wrote, on “a belief in the legality of enacted rules
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue
commands.”33 Every system, Weber observed, “attempts to establish and
29. J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and
Legitimacy, 64 ZAÖRV 547, 553 (2004).
30. Neil Walker, Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation, in EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 27, 32 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003).
31. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1511 (2005–06); Robert E. Hudec, Comment, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 297 (Roger B. Porter,
Pierre Sauvé, Arvind Subramanian, & Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001).
32. For a “pessimistic” account that global public law as presently constituted will not attain
democratic legitimacy, see Petra Dobner, More Law, Less Democracy? Democracy and
Transnational Constitutionalism, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 141, 160 (Petra
Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., 2010).
33. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 215
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to cultivate the belief in its own legitimacy.”34 Legitimacy grounded in
belief and right is linked to Weber’s account of “domination,” based upon
three ideal-typical sources of authority: traditional, charismatic, and
rational-legal.35 Weber envisaged this last category as having become
predominant in the late nineteenth century, though he did not preclude
the possibility that these other sources of legitimacy would
contemporaneously be available.36
Shared belief in the legality of legislative and administrative
machinery is taken for granted within the national state. However, it is
harder to sustain such “input-oriented legitimacy” in levels beyond it.37
This is because there are few surrogates for the feedback mechanisms
associated with democratically authorized law-making beyond the level
of states. States do have the power to re-write treaty terms, but this will
happen infrequently and only with the consent of negotiating partners.38
With little likelihood of responsive feedback mechanisms materializing
any time soon, such shared belief in legality is not likely to arise out of
investment law’s domains.
There is some debate about whether Weber’s understanding of legality
is too focused on formality and, therefore, bereft of normativity. 39 I take
the view that Weber presupposes law to embody values that he associates
with commercial life.40 This is a legal order that facilitates certainty,
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1st vol. 1978).
34. Id. at 953 (2d vol., 1978).
35. THE MAX WEBER DICTIONARY 18991 (Richard Swedborg & Ola Agevall eds., 2d. ed.
2016).
36. ANDREAS ANTER, MAX WEBER’S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE: ORIGINS, STRUCTURE
AND SIGNIFICANCE 54 (2014) (“the concept [of legitimacy] is defined nowhere in his writing”).
37. See SCHARPF, supra note 25, at 187.
38. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties Over Time – Treaty Practice and
Interpretation in a Changing World, (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working
Paper No. 2015/02 40), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf
(“International law makes numerous options available to treaty partners wishing to influence treaty
interpretation, but few countries seem to avail themselves of these options.”). On the difficulty of
securing the consent of powerful exporting states to alternative treaty text, see the discussion of the
negotiations between the U.S. and South Africa in David Schneiderman, Promoting Equality, Black
Economic Empowerment, and the Future of Investment Rules, 25 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 246 (2009).
39. WOLFGANG MOMMSEN, MAX WEBER AND GERMAN POLITICS: 18901920 404 (Michael
S. Steinberg trans., 1984).
40. See David Schneiderman, International Investment Law as Formally Rational Law: A
Weberian Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang eds., forthcoming 2018) (analyzing the challenge of Weber’s view
to keep substantive values from creeping into formal law’s domains); David Schneiderman,
Judging in Secular Times: Max Weber and the Rise of Proportionality, 63 SUP. CT. L. REV. 557
(2013) (discussing Weber’s embrace of a model of “formal” legal rationality focused on meansends analysis).
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predictability, and calculability, and so embodies an “ethical
minimum.”41 Whatever one’s view of this, the claim that legality begets
legitimacy is an argument that one hears from time to time in investment
law circles. Most will acknowledge, however, that something more is
required.42
B. Legitimacy as Deliberation
Even as the discussion at the level of states remains contested, the
stakes in identifying legitimate political-legal orders have been amplified
by the spread of transnational regimes like investment law. This leads to
a second understanding of legitimacy. This is a deliberative democratic
account whereby we understand legitimate law as the product of
democratic processes that include all affected.43 This mirrors Jürgen
Habermas’ “procedural” account of law premised upon the principle of
democracy: that law is the product of self-legislation by citizens.44
Unhappy with Weber’s circular account45 or accounts which generate
legitimacy by virtue of the law’s “generality” (or its a priori moral
content) and which Habermas previously endorsed,46 Habermas offers
the “most prominent input-based normative” account.47 This is a
deliberative model of law-making that generates chains of legitimacy
from local to supranational institutions. If the genesis of law is the
product of inclusive republican institutions, it is that process, rather than
its form or moral content, which generates legitimacy. This is how
Habermas explains away legitimacy problems associated with the rise of
the World Trade Organization. The mechanisms of opinion and will
formation within states generate the “chain of legitimation” with which
transnational legal institutions can produce binding law. 48 Such
41. WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER, THE RISE OF WESTERN RATIONALISM: MAX WEBER’S
DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY 114 (Guenther Roth trans., 1981).
42. ANTER, supra note 36, at 59, 63.
43. A proceduralist account of legitimacy in international law can be found in THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 3046 (1995) (noting that the
indicators are determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence).
44. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 120 (William Rehg trans., 1996); see Bodansky, supra note
21, at 330 (discussing the procedural and substantive factors that arguably contribute to normative
legitimacy); ROBERT A, DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 49
(rev. ed. 1970) (similarly referring to the “principle of affected interests”).
45. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOLUME ONE: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 265 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (explaining that belief in
legality generates legitimacy which, in turn, bolsters belief).
46. HABERMAS, supra note 44, at 102.
47. Bodansky, supra note 21, at 331.
48. Jürgen Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation
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agreements, he writes, were “the product of political voluntarism.”49
They were not imposed unilaterally by any one state, but were the
consequence of “negotiated path-dependent cumulative decisions.”50 The
problem with Habermas’ account is that it presupposes that treaties that
give rise to transnational norms are produced under conditions of
democratic deliberation. This is not often the case. Robert Dahl observes
that it is “notoriously difficult for citizens to exercise effective control
over many key decisions” in the realm of foreign relations.51 These are
matters often concentrated within the executive branches of operative
democracies—the most effective branch, one could say.
C. Legitimacy as Justification
A third version looks to the role of justification in generating and
maintaining legitimacy. This is an approach advanced by political theorist
David Beetham, who isolates three distinct and demanding elements to
any legitimacy claim:52 conformity with established rules, justification
with reference to beliefs shared by dominant and subordinate classes, and,
finally, evidence of consent by the subordinated to the power relation.53
The first rules-based step resonates in the positivistic account attributed
to Weber—an account rooted in appeals to past conduct rather than an
appeal to justification.54 The third step, evidence of consent, might be
understood as satisfying Habermas’ call for democratic authorship. The
distinctiveness of the second step is that it requires a shared belief not
only in legality, but also in exercises of power that can be justified in
order to secure legitimacy.55 It is an account of political authority where
power is fused with “legitimate social purpose.”56 Beetham devotes
Problems of a Constitution for World Society, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 444, 447 (2008).
49. Jürgen Habermas, Euroskepticism, Market Europe, or a Europe of (World) Citizens?, in
TIME OF TRANSITIONS 81 (Ciaran Cronin & Max Pensky eds. & trans., 2006).
50. Id.
51. Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in
DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 19, 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
52. It is more demanding than Scharpf’s output-oriented perspective suggests and so looks more
like the mix one finds in democratic nation states. See SCHARPF, supra note 25, at 1112 (discussing
legitimacy requirements).
53. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 16 (2d ed. 2013).
54. Hannah Arendt bifurcates legitimacy from justification in On Violence, in HANNAH
ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 103, 151 (1969). See also A. John Simmons, Justification and
Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 122, 156
(2001) (finding that, insofar as they are not genuinely “voluntary association[s],” no “existing states
are legitimate”).
55. BEETHAM, supra note 53, at 17.
56. JOHN GERALD RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 64 (1998).
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considerable attention to identifying the authoritative sources out of
which one can derive justificatory beliefs.57 For the purposes of this
discussion, I focus on one of them: that power is justifiably exercised in
the service of the “common interest.” This is a rhetorical strategy to
which elites often have recourse. Beetham maintains that, “[p]rovided the
resource or skill they command has been acquired according to the rules,
making [power] available to others for a consideration will seem less like
an extortion racket than a public service, and the price demanded as their
legitimate reward for performing it.”58 This is an account congenial to
legitimate rule by competent elites. It bears a family resemblance to the
dominant discourse of “good governance,” in which authorities are
expected to govern in accordance with rules laid down by experts.59
The early nineteenth century historian and politician François Guizot
had a similar, functional understanding of legitimacy that called for
continuous justification. Guizot turns out to be an apt guide to thinking
about legitimacy in this context,60 as he disparaged universal suffrage in
favor of rule by a competent elite.61 It was the “third estate,” represented
by the newly emergent bourgeoisie, who were Guizot’s “true legitimate
aristocracy.”62 He was suspicious, in other words, of the capacity of
ordinary citizens to participate in self-rule, a theme common to nineteenth
century liberal thought63 and a sentiment commonly on display in

57. BEETHAM, supra note 53, at 6997.
58. Id. at 83.
59. On rule by experts as contributing to legitimacy, see Daniel Halberstam, Local, Global and
Plural Constitutionalism: Europe Meets the World, in THE WORLDS OF EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 150, 173 (Gráinne de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2012), and, on a more
skeptical note, Peters, supra note 25, at 339. For the multiple connotations of “good governance,”
see Jonathan Bonnitcha, The Principle of Good Governance in the Reasoning of Investor-State
Arbitral Tribunals, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE DECISIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: 19922012 583 (Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger &
H.E. Judge C.G. Weeramantry eds., 2017); SAMULI SEPPÄNEN, GOOD GOVERNANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
60. This is not because he was preoccupied with the treatment of aliens abroad. Nor was Guizot
a liberal who preferred governments that governed least. “Laissez faire, laissez passez,” he
declared, “informs, but gives no guidance.” FRANÇOIS GUIZOT, DES MOYENS DE GOUVERNEMENT
ET D’OPPOSITION DANS L’ÉTAT ACTUEL DE LA FRANCE 129 (Claude Lefort ed., 1988), translated
in PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF LIBERALISM 97 (Rebecca Balinksi trans.,
1994).
61. AURELIAN CRAIUTU, LIBERALISM UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE
FRENCH DOCTRINAIRES 68 (2003).
62. Id. at 224.
63. Aurelian Craiutu, Guizot’s Elitist Theory of Representative Government, in 15 CRITICAL
REVIEW 261, 267 (2003).
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investment treaty arbitration.64 The content of rulings often display
ambivalence, if not outright contempt, for the output of legitimate
democratic processes.65
Guizot’s distaste for universal suffrage was a response to the terror that
followed upon the heels of the French Revolution. It was time to bring
the Revolution to an end and to stabilize the irreversible march of liberty
and social equality.66 What was once democracy, Guizot complained,
was now turning into “anarchy.”67 By limiting the franchise to competent
elites, representative democracy could produce rule by those with the
requisite “degree of independence and intellectual development” to
govern in the general interest.68 It was from among the ranks of the third
estate that representatives would be chosen and expected to govern
according to Guizot’s triptych of “reason, truth and justice.”69 Rule by
reason, truth, and justice represented the “true law”—one that Guizot
likens, on occasion, to “divine law” and the “law of God.”70
There was no right to rule, however, merely by sheer force of
numbers—by securing a majority of votes from among a limited
franchise.71 In order for rule to be legitimate, power needs to “justify
itself both before it is assumed and all the time that it is exercised.”72
Self-rule, even with a cramped franchise, was fallible and so was

64. Schneiderman, supra note 5, at 915–21 (pointing to discussions of democracy in investment
treaty arbitration).
65. Id. Where “elections or democracy were mentioned by arbitrators,” Van Harten finds in his
content analysis of 162 arbitration awards, “it was often to suggest that politics had contributed to
unsound decisions and that the arbitrators’ role was to ensure that investors were compensated.”
VAN HARTEN, supra note 9, at 73. Democratic regimes are even more likely to face investor claims
at a statistically significant level. Zoe Williams, Domestic Demands and International Agreements:
What Causes Investor Disputes?, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
187, 207 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015).
66. FRANÇOIS FURET, REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 1770–1880, 291 (Antonia Nevill trans.,
1992); M. GUIZOT, DEMOCRACY IN MODERN COMMUNITIES 14 (2d. ed. trans., 1838); PIERRE
ROSANVALLON, LE MOMENT GUIZOT 26 (1985); Pierre Rosanvallon, Guizot, in A CRITICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 938, 941 (François Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1989).
67. GUIZOT, supra note 66, at 15–16 (“It has recruited and engaged in its service power more
brutal, passions more gross, ideas more narrow, and pretensions more blind.”).
68. GUIZOT, supra note 23, at 334.
69. Id. at 61.
70. Id. at 54, 295.
71. Id. at 60. The franchise law of 1817 limited the electorate to 90,000 citizens out of a
population of 29 million. CRAIUTU, supra note 61, at 23233. Guizot acknowledged that the
population having the capacity to govern by reason was not fixed but was fluid. GUIZOT, supra
note 23, at 334. It was open to each individual as they attained the requisite capacity. Id.
72. GUIZOT, supra note 23, at 58.
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continually vulnerable to error and arbitrariness.73 In order to secure the
requisite legitimacy, voters should continually have available to them
publicly available reasons for the exercise of power over them. This is
why Guizot, together with his political allies, the Doctrinaires, insisted
upon education, openness, and publicity.74 In this way, the principles of
reason, justice, and truth—the very ones that would guide government—
would be discoverable by all.75 “Electoral precautions, the debates in the
deliberative assemblies, the publication of these debates, the liberty of the
press, the responsibility of ministers,” Guizot explained,
all these arrangements have for their object to insure that the majority
shall be declared only after it has well authenticated itself, to compel it
ever to legitimize itself, in order to its own preservation, and to place
the minority in such a position as that it may contest the power and the
right of the majority.76

These amounted to the application of a series of “tests” by which
governors continually demonstrated the degree to which the exercise of
power conformed to the demands of justice.77 With education, openness,
and publicity, power could be subject to “endless questioning” and its
legitimacy rendered secure.78 Guizot’s account is helpful, not because
investment tribunals should be treated as equivalent to representative
bodies, but because he underscores the critical roles that transparency and
contestability play in supporting legitimacy claims once power is
assumed and continuously exercised.79
One can imagine that subordinated groups which have been the subject
of power relations might come to believe, over time, that power-holders
73. Id. 6061.
74. FRANÇOIS GUIZOT, THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN EUROPE 49 (William Hazlitt trans.,
1997).
75. Id.
76. GUIZOT, supra note 23, at 63, 372.
77. Id. at 296.
78. CRAIUTU, supra note 61, at 200. Rosanvallon traces this model of “continuous process of
interaction and reflection between the people and the representatives” to Condorcet in PIERRE
ROSANVALLON, LA DÉMOCRATIE INACHEVÉE: HISTOIRE DE LA SOUVERAINETÉ DU PEUPLE EN
FRANCE 62 (2000); see Marquis de Condorcet, On the Principles of the Constitutional Plan
Presented to the National Convention (1793), in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 143, 147
(Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976) (discussing the merits of deliberative openness); see also Andrew
Jainchill & Samuel Moyn, French Democracy Between Totalitarianism and Solidarity: Pierre
Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography, 76 J. MOD. HIST. 107, 132 (2004) (discussing
Rosanvallon and his analysis of Condorcet).
79. See also ARMIN VON BOGANDY AND INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 194 (Ruth Mackenzie et. al. eds., Thomas Dunlap
trans. 2014) (describing how the courts draw on democratic legitimacy that is generated by the
legislative process).
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serve the general interest. Such a “constructivist” dimension promotes
legitimacy because it confirms that experience under the claim to
legitimate rule is credible.80 That legitimacy can build over time is
underscored by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope’s interactional account,
which understands legitimacy as requiring “continuous practice.” “[A]
very particular kind of practice is required to make and sustain
international legal norms,” they maintain.81 Legitimacy, in short, is an
ongoing project.82 It is acquired by “hard work.”83
With this understanding of legitimacy as a continuous project in mind,
it is instructive to examine empirical research regarding public support
for the United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”). Caution is required,
however, as American public opinion is comprised, in part, of a unique
cultish “faith” in the Constitution that is not replicated, for instance, in
many other capital-exporting states.84 Propping up the Court is yet
another layer of legitimacy ascribed to a constitutional founding that is
associated with popular sovereignty. This feature further distances
national constitutional experiences from international realms that have no
equivalent legitimating foundations.85 That experience, nevertheless, is
helpful insofar as public support for the institution is understood to
fluctuate. This is conveyed in the empirical literature by distinguishing
between “diffuse” and “specific” support.86
When an institution like the Supreme Court generates a “reservoir of
goodwill,” it prolongs the longevity of its support.87 This is labeled
“diffuse support,” and it enables the Court to get away with occasionally
unpopular decisions. In the course of SCOTUS issuing decisions that may
lack widespread support, public opinion may dip in a direction away from
the Court, resulting in a decline of “specific support.” Specific support
80. BEETHAM, supra note 53, at 106 (explaining how a system of power relations shapes the
expectations of subordinate groups, making justifications for the rules of power credible).
81. BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 26, at 54.
82. Jürgen Neyer pursues a similar argument at the European level. See JÜRGEN NEYER, THE
JUSTIFICATION OF EUROPE: A POLITICAL THEORY OF SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION 8687
(2012) (stating that “discourses of justification are of necessity never-ending . . . [serving as]
instruments for legitimating political action”).
83. VON BOGANDY & VENZKE, supra note 79, at 152.
84. CHERYL WELCH, DE TOCQUEVILLE 251 (2001).
85. VON BOGANDY & VENZKE, supra note 79, at 20. Paul Kahn describes the American
Supreme Court as deriving its legitimacy form “its capacity to speak in the voice of a transhistorical
popular sovereign” in PAUL KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 13 (Dick Howard ed., 2011).
86. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965).
87. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS:
POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 65 (2009).
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may decline, for instance, when the Court is perceived as engaging less
in “law” and more in partisan politics. Survey respondents typically will
be more supportive of the Court as an institution when they understand it
as having recourse to judicial methods—when it is seen to be conducting
its affairs independently of politics.88 This is how support for the Court
was sustained in the aftermath of the ruling in Bush v. Gore, which
declared the Florida recount of votes in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and, as a consequence, handed the presidency to George W.
Bush.89 Though there was a subsequent decline in specific support for the
Court, diffuse support helped to sustain the Court’s legitimacy through
this rough patch.90 From these empirical observations regarding
SCOTUS, we can better understand legitimacy as requiring ongoing
maintenance and work over time.
Brigitte Stern downgrades legitimacy problems to a “so-called crisis”
which, given the regime’s youthfulness, she likens to a “teenager’s
crisis.”91 Seen in light of the empirical evidence regarding SCOTUS, this
is not something that an institution merely outgrows. Instead, legitimacy
is a value that an institution must continually cultivate.
***
In the following parts of this Article, I take up a select number of
strategies that have been embraced by state actors as well as arbitrators.
These strategies mostly have arisen, expressly or impliedly, as a way of
addressing legitimacy concerns. They are not necessarily distinct—they
often appear in combination and have been raised, on occasion, both by
states and arbitrators. Nor is the discussion meant to be exhaustive—there
are many other strategies that could be taken up.92 The inquiry is focused
on the question of whether these strategies respond to concerns raised by
“legitimacy as justification.” Do these strategies offer up a means by
which citizens can learn about, embrace, or resist the regime’s dictates of
what is in the common interest? I suggest that the state and arbitral
88. Id. at 113.
89. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. James L. Gibson et. al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000:
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003).
91. Brigitte Stern, The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance Between the
Protection of Investors and the States’ Capacity to Regulate, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT REGIME: EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 175 (José E. Alvarez & Karl Sauvant
eds., 2011).
92. A helpful suite of reforms is suggested by Karl P. Sauvant & Frederico Ortino, Improving
the International Law and Policy Regime: Options for the Future (2013),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Improving-The-International-Investment-Law-and-PolicyRegime-Options-for-the-Future-Sept-2013.pdf.
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strategies under discussion fall far short of this mark.
It might be thought unfair to ask this of a regime that draws upon
dispute resolution mechanisms associated with private commercial
arbitration. It is, after all, a model adapted and “taken over” by the
commercial arbitration community, which runs it “as a new form of
commercial arbitration business.”93 If the discussion below is revealing
of anything, it is that such a dispute resolution mechanism is ill-suited to
respond to legitimacy concerns. If there are legitimacy problems, much
of the blame should lie at the feet, then, of the regime’s norms
entrepreneurs—state officials, lawyers, and arbitrators. The discussion
signals that it is time to rethink the foundations of international
investment law with a view to rendering it more fit for the role it is
expected to play in the public life of citizens and states. Given the
investment regime’s continuing instability and long-term legitimation
difficulties, this is a task that, sooner or later, will need attending.94
II. STATE STRATEGIES
The investment treaty and arbitration regime would not have been able
to secure even a semblance of legitimacy without the active participation
of national states. States, after all, are the authors of this regime of binding
legality.95 They also have sought to justify adhesion to investment law
norms and the accompanying diminution in policy space with reference
to a number of strategies. These are in the nature of what Sassen calls
“state work” in the service of new “legalities.”96 This is because what we
describe as “global,” including the strategic functions necessary to
structure and maintain economic globalization, are nested within national
legal systems.97 In this Part I run through a few of these strategies—two
of them discursive and the other a proposal for institutional reform—that
have been offered up by states to legitimate the investment treaty regime.

93. Thomas Wälde, The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration, in NEW ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 43, 87 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W. Wälde eds., 2007).
94. My own modest contribution to this endeavor is found in David Schneiderman, Listening to
Investors (and Others): Audi Alteram Partem and the Future of International Investment Law, in
SECOND THOUGHTS: INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 131
(Armand de Mestral ed., 2017).
95. For a book-length discussion about the states and their relationship to investment law see
DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2013).
96. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 231 (2006).
97. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 13
(1996).
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A. Rule of Law
The typical formulation of this strategy is that investment law
facilitates the rule of law in global spheres. Whereas relations of force
previously determined the outcome of economic disputes, now legal
rules, providing “predictability and stability” and applied by
dispassionate tribunals, rule the day. 98 And, whereas politics determined
when states would espouse the claims of their nationals, the regime is
now “depoliticized” and exercises its rule at some distance from
politics.99
There is a lot packed into these claims. Brian Tamanaha, after all, has
identified a surfeit of constituent elements associated with the rule of law,
of which only a few may be advanced by investment law.100 The
difficulty is that those having recourse to this rhetoric in the investment
law context tend to not be very precise about what they mean by the rule
of law101—few “ever articulate precisely what it means.”102 When there
is specific articulation of its premises, such discussion tends to reproduce
a laundry list of both formal and substantive conceptions that purport to
represent essential elements of the rule of law in “major domestic legal
systems.”103 Rather than respond to each element here, I prefer to
emphasize the weight such accounts have placed on the ways of the
lawyer as corresponding to rule of law promotion. If the object of the
investment law regime is to constrain state capacity, lawyers are well
placed to structure politics so as to limit power in ways that protect the
interests of property and contract. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed in
98. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 10911 (2d ed. 1997).
99. On the depoliticization claim, see generally David Schneiderman, Revisiting the
Depoliticization of Investment Disputes, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND POLICY 2010–2011 693 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2012).
100. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91 (2004).
101. E.g., JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 2 (2013) (“So we accept what we call
‘the rule of law’. Yet there is much hesitation in that acceptance.”); Brower and Blanchard, supra
note 14, at 69899 (characterizing the rule of law as encompassing access to international
adjudication); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing the
International Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193 (2001) (discussing the
rule of law in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11); Thomas W. Wälde, Renegotiating acquired
rights in the oil and gas industries: Industry and political cycles meet the rule of law, 1 J. WORLD
ENERGY L. & BUS. 55, 57 n.11 (2008) (relying on TAMANAHA, supra note 100, and a study by
Friedrich von Hayek).
102. TAMANAHA, supra note 100, at 3.
103. E.g., Stephan Schill, “Fair and Equitable Treatment” as an Embodiment of the Rule of
Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
(ICSID): TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 31, 4142, 61 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian Tams eds.,
2007) (listing seven specific normative principles).
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the early nineteenth century, lawyers have “inclinations natural to the
privileged class” and so offer a “counterpoise” to the democratic
element.”104
If the object is to “juridicalize” disputes between capital-exporting and
capital-importing states, it needs to be acknowledged that this can be
achieved in ways that do not require the construction and maintenance of
a legal order beyond the reach of national judiciaries. Rather,
development of rule of law norms and institutions in states that do not
have them could, instead, be a priority. It is so for scholars working within
the field of law and development. After a review of the empirical
evidence, Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock conclude that it is
preferable to “emphasize reforms that enhance the quality of institutions
charged with the responsibility for enacting laws and regulations,” rather
than merely focus on improving the enforcement of contract or property
rights.105 Proposals made by the World Bank Investment Climate Unit,
similarly, aim to forestall conflict with foreign investors by having states
adopt certain “conflict management mechanisms.”106 This entails the
adoption of institutional techniques and mechanisms with which to
respond to investor claims before they rise to the level of an international
dispute.
Rule of law promotion appears mostly to be a rhetorical strategy, not
all that convincing in the case of host states with viable judicial systems
having independence and impartiality. The strategy is intended to not
only remove jurisdiction over investment disputes from national judicial
systems, but also the role of citizen oversight in the conduct and
resolution of disputes. It falls well short of a viable and ongoing strategy
of legitimation.
B. Constitutional Rights
Constitutional strategies often are allied with rule of law strategies.107
104. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 20506 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d ed.
vol. 11 1946). On Tocqueville’s understanding of the role of lawyers in a democracy, see David
Schneiderman, Against Constitutional Excess: Tocquevillian Reflections on International
Investment Law, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
105. Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22 THIRD
WORLD Q. 21, 33 (2001).
106. World Bank Group Investment Climate Unit, Investor-State Conflict Management: A
Preliminary Sketch, E15 TASK FORCE ON INVESTMENT POLICY (Nov. 2015),
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Investment-World-Bank-GroupFINAL.pdf.
107. Andreas Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution, in RULING THE
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 69, 109
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
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Stretching the constitutional analogy beyond the nation states to
transnational legal spheres is considered a surefire way to prop up
institutions with weakened legitimacy having global ambitions.108 It has
been a strategy pursued by state actors predominantly in the United
States, but also in Europe. When American presidents recently have
sought Trade Promotion Authority (“TPA”)—President Bush in 2002
and President Obama in 2015—supporters of TPA maintained that
investment rules resembled the constitutional law of the United States.109
Investment protections, Republican Senator Phil Gramm declared on the
floor of the Senate, “were modeled on familiar concepts of American law
[and] became the standard for protection of private property and
investment around the world.”110
As a consequence of persistent concerns being expressed in Congress,
the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 directed the executive branch
to ensure that foreign investors were not “accorded greater substantive
rights” than U.S. citizens in the United States.111 In 2015, the United
States Trade Representative (“USTR”) again maintained that investment
“obligations and U.S. investment agreements are based on the same legal
principles available under the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. legal
system.”112 For the USTR, this helped to explain the perfect U.S. win
record (thirteen for thirteen) as a respondent state in investment disputes
launched under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”).113 This was also the rhetorical tack adopted by a group of
some fifty law professors who declared that while investor rights “are
similar to those guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, . . . [which] might
not be guaranteed in foreign countries.”114 In the course of so arguing,
proponents acknowledged that NAFTA was a version of hegemonic U.S.
constitutional law and not some denationalized version of customary
international law. This also was the strategy adopted by the Trump
108. CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE RULE OF LAW: THE COMMON SENSE OF GLOBAL POLITICS 138
(2014).
109. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY
(TPA) AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 7 (2015).
110. 107 CONG. REC. S4595 (daily ed. May 21, 2002).
111. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2017).
112. FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Office of the United States
Trade Representative (Mar. 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/factsheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds.
113. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 15, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
and 605 (1993).
114. Payam Akhavan et al., An open letter about investor-state dispute settlement, MCGILL
FORTIER CHAIR IN INT’L ARB. & INT’L COM. L. (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.mcgill.ca/fortierchair/isds-open-letter.
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administration during NAFTA renegotiations—an agreement that
candidate Donald Trump characterized as a “disaster.”115 According to
USTR’s “Summary of Objectives” in renegotiating NAFTA, the object
is to have U.S. investors secure “important rights consistent with U.S.
legal principles and practice, while ensuring that NAFTA country
investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights
than domestic investors.”116
There remains some doubt, however, about the degree to which
investment law mirrors U.S. constitutional law. Simply by virtue of the
variety and scope of economic interests that are protected by investor
rights, the latter exceed by some margin U.S. constitutional protections.
Indeed, investor rights seem hard to contain. Beyond regulations of
“property,” ordinarily understood, treaties secure the protection of
interests well beyond rational basis review in the case of run-of-the-mill
economic regulation, all of which points in the direction of rights that
exceed those available to U.S. citizens.117
Europe, too, has been preoccupied with ensuring that foreign investors
have no greater rights than those available to European citizens. To this
end, the European Union (“EU”) has also made “no-higher-thandomestic-standards” arguments.118 The EU Parliament was pressed to
declare that “Union agreements should afford foreign investors the same
high level of protection as Union law and the general principles common
to the laws of the member states grant to investors from within the Union,
but not a higher level of protection.”119 Yet, a comparison of EU national
and regional law with obligations that were likely to arise in a stalled
U.S.-EU agreement (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
or “TTIP”) concludes that Europe will have created a different type of
liability, giving foreign investors a different right than EU investors.120
115. See Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html (“NAFTA,
as an example, has been a total disaster for the United States.”).
116. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE
NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 9 (2017).
117. For further discussion, see David Schneiderman, ‘Writing the Rules of the Global
Economy’: How America Defines the Contours of International Investment Law (unpublished) (on
file with author).
118. Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New
Generation of International Investment Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 639, 651 (2015).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Lauge Poulsen et al., Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection, in RULE-MAKERS OR
RULE-TAKERS? EXPLORING THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 139,
173 (D Hamilton & J Pelkmans eds., 2015); Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Investment Treaty Law and the
Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions, 78 MOD. L. REV. 793 (2015).
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The Joint Interpretative Declaration on CETA, intended as a response
to opposition to ISDS emanating from the Belgian region of Wallonia,
declares that “CETA will not result in foreign investors being treated
more favourably than domestic investors.”121 From either a Canadian or
European perspective, this simply will not be the case.122 To the extent
that investment claims are within the purview of specialized tribunals,
modeled upon private commercial arbitration, and in excess of
constitutional rights available to the citizens of leading developed states,
legitimacy becomes more, not less, difficult to justify.
C. Investment Court
Specific legitimation problems arose in the course of negotiating the
TTIP between the EU and U.S. After hitting the pause button on
negotiations of the investment chapter and undertaking a European-wide
online consultation, the EU Commission returned with a proposal for a
new “investment court” having a tribunal of first instance and another
tribunal to hear appeals.123 Reports indicated that U.S. negotiators did not
welcome the EU proposal. According to leaked documents reporting on
the state of play, the EU and U.S. negotiators did not even broach the
subject in one of their last round of talks.124
Though not originally a part of the Canada and EU investment chapter
in CETA, the newly elected Canadian Liberal government was intent on
rapidly finalizing the agreement. Adopting the European proposal for an
investment court during the course of the mandatory legal scrubbing of
treaty text appears to have been a part of the Canadian strategy of
smoothing CETA’s passage. The CETA text was quickly amended to
include elements of the EU proposal—the one originally proposed for the

121. General Secretariat of the Council, Joint Interpretative Declaration on the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and its Member
States, at 5 (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Joint-EU-Canadadeclaration-1.pdf [hereinafter CETA Joint Interpretive Instrument].
122. For the Canadian scene, see Armand de Mestral & Robin Morgan, Does Canadian Law
Provide Remedies Equivalent to NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitration?, in SECOND THOUGHTS:
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 155 (Armand de Mestral
ed., 2016) (explaining that, in most disputes, there is “no arguable domestic claim equivalent” to
the NAFTA one); see also discussion in DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY’S PROMISE 119–20 (2008).
123. European Commission, Commission Proposes New Investment Court System for TTIP and
Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1364.
124. Greenpeace, Note-Tactical State of Play of the TTIP Negotiations, TRADELEAKS BY
GREANPEACE 24 (Mar. 2016), https://trade-leaks.org/?s=tactical.
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Americans.125 Canada is now on the front lines of the EU initiative (along
with Vietnam, which adopted a similar proposal in the 2015 EU-Vietnam
Free Trade Agreement), one that both parties have committed to
transforming into a multilateral mechanism by negotiating similar terms
with other trading partners.126 “CETA’s approach has the best claim to
legitimacy in any treaty to date,” Tony VanDuzer writes.127
The new model of dispute settlement included in CETA—both tribunal
and appellate decisionmaking—looks little like a “court,” however.128 It
seems not quite right, then, to characterize it as “inspired by the principles
of public judicial systems in the European Union and its Member States
and Canada.”129 The proposal, instead, appears to be modeled more upon
WTO dispute-settlement mechanisms than on U.S. or EU judicial
systems.130 Despite joint Canada-EU claims that it is “radical,”131 the

125. See Barrie McKenna, Canada, EU revise trade deal, add investor-state dispute tribunal,
THE GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 29, 2016), https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/industry-news/the-law-page/ottawa-says-legal-review-of-canada-eu-free-trade-dealcompleted/article28946075/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com (stating that the changes in the
free-trade agreement were “aimed at appeasing European critics”).
126. In pursuit of this goal, Canada and the European Union jointly sponsored a “Meeting on
Possible Creation of a Multilateral Investment Court” at the Fourteenth Session of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi. The July 9, 2016, event was not open
to all participants; it was by invitation only. The programme is available at World Investment Forum
2016 Programme, UNCTAD http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/programme2016/. The
initiative was repeated the week of December 12, 2016, in Geneva. See News Release, Global
Affairs of Canada, Canada, a Leader in Progressive Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms for
International
Trade
(Dec.
14,
2016),
https://www.canada.ca/en/globalaffairs/news/2016/12/canada-leader-progressive-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-internationaltrade.html.
127. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius Convention Serve as a
Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Introduction of a
Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism? Analysis and Roadmap, CIDS –
GENEVA
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT,
para.
28,
122,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/CIDS_Research_Paper_Mauritius.pdf;
J.A.
VanDuzer,
Investor-State Dispute Settlement in CETA: Is it the Gold Standard?, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE
COMMENTARY NO. 459, 17 (Oct. 2016).
128. Gus Van Harten, Key Flaws in the European Commission’s Proposals for Foreign Investor
Protection in TTIP, 12 OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 16
(2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2692122.
129. Andrew Newcombe, Canadian Investment Treaty Policy: Stay the Course on Progressive
Developments, in THE ART OF THE STATE VOLUME VI: REDESIGNING CANADIAN TRADE POLICIES
FOR NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 411, 433 (Stephen Tapp, Ari Van Assche & Robert Wolfe eds.,
2016).
130. August Reinisch, The European Union and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From
Investor-State Arbitration to a Permanent Investment Court, in SECOND THOUGHTS: INVESTORSTATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 333, 355 (Armand de Mestral ed.,
2017).
131. CETA Joint Interpretive Instrument, supra note 121, at 6.
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new mechanism offers so modest a change in dispute resolution, observes
Céline Levesque, that it is unlikely to make much of a difference to
arbitral outcomes.132
As the German Magistrate’s Association complains, the personnel
eligible for appointment to the new arbitral mechanism are no different
from those already steering ISDS in problematic directions.133 Members
of the tribunal of first instance as well as the appellate tribunal are
expected to have “demonstrated expertise” in public international law and
international investment law, in particular.134 Though arbitrators are on
retainer for periods of up to ten years, the financial incentive for
interpreting standards expansively remains—they earn substantial
income when sitting as tribunals, after all, and they will continue to seek
employment as arbitrators after their appointment under CETA lapses.135
Limited grounds will be available to appellate tribunals to modify or
reverse a tribunal’s award, expanding slightly upon those already laid
down for annulment under the ICSID Convention.136 While a new code
of ethics may reduce conflicts of interest, there is much baked into the
system that will be hard to reverse. For instance, a quantitative study of
the behavior of investment tribunal chairs reveals that, where an arbitrator
has previously served on tribunals at the behest of claimants, he or she is
likely to be “partial” by ruling in favor of investors. The reverse turns out
not to be the case—chairs serving previously at the behest of respondent
states are likely to be impartial.137 The authors of this study recommend,
as a consequence, that tribunal presidents be selected from a pool of
candidates who have not systematically served as claimant-appointed
arbitrators.138 It is not clear that selecting presiding arbitrators from a
132. Céline Lévesque, The European Commission Proposal for an Investment Court System:
Out with the Old, In with the New?, in SECOND THOUGHTS: INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES 59, 75 (Armand de Mestral ed., 2017).
133. German Magistrates Association, Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal
in TTIP – the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015, No. 04/16
(Feb.
2016),
https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/euus_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf.
134. David A. Gantz makes no reference to the latter, more particular, qualification in this
volume. David A. Gantz, The CETA Ratification Saga: The Demise of ISDS in EU Trade
Agreements?, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 366 (2017).
135. These retainer fee and ICSID fee schedules, apparently, are low enough to act as a
“deterrent,” according to Reinisch, supra note 130, at 352.
136. So as to include grounds under the New York Convention. See Reinisch, supra note 130,
at 352.
137. Julian Donaubauer et al., Winning or Losing in Investor-to-State Dispute Resolution: The
Role of Arbitrator Bias and Experience 8 (Kiel, Working Paper No. 2074, 2017),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/156236/1/882674609.pdf.
138. Id. at 19.
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roster proposed by the CETA model will check these sorts of tendencies.
This is why it is accurate to describe the EU initiative as “in
essence . . . (still) formally committed to the ‘traditional’ model” of
ISDS.139
There is an additional rhetorical strategy accompanying the promotion
of the investment court model that has been embraced by both Canada
and the EU. They have repeatedly characterized CETA as a “progressive”
agreement.140 In the Joint Interpretative Declaration on CETA, the parties
announced that it “is a modern and progressive trade agreement” in which
“investment rules and dispute resolution will offer a progressive path
forward for future agreements around the world.”141 In a relatively short
speech delivered in Ottawa on March 21, 2017, EU Trade Commissioner
Celia Malmström invoked the adjective “progressive” twelve times.142 A
progressive trade and investment agenda, she declared, “promotes
values”—progressive trade policy recognizes that “trade can bring
benefits for both sides.”143 In a shot across the bow of Brexit and Trump
ethno-nationalism, Malmström declared, “[i]n an age when some want to
rebuild walls, reimpose barriers, restrict people’s freedom to move we
stand open to progressive trade with the world.”144 These claims are
making their way into scholarly writing as well.145
If we were to ask the leadership of NGOs skeptical about the benefits
of ISDS to self-identify politically, they likely would style themselves as
“progressives.” Walking in the footsteps of early twentieth century
reform movements,146 they are seeking to tame the influence of large
private enterprise, particularly in the developing world. They would not
139. Steffen Hindelang & Teoman M. Hagemeyer, In Pursuit of an International Investment
Court: Recently Negotiated Investment Chapters in EU Comprehensive FTA in Comparative
Perspective
22,
198
(July
4,
2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_STU(2017)603844
140. See CETA Joint Interpretive Instrument, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that CETA “is a
modern and progressive trade agreement which will help boost trade and economic activity”).
141. CETA Joint Interpretive Instrument, supra note 121, at 6.
142. Cecilia Malmström, Progressive Trade Policy in a More Protectionist World,
CANADA2020 (Mar. 21, 2017), http://canada2020.ca/malmstrom-progressive-trade-policy-in-amore-protectionist-world/.
143. Id.
144. See id. (emphasizing the progressive nature of the EU to bring benefits).
145. See Newcombe, supra note 129, at 433 (discussing how CETA is a modern and progressive
trade agreement).
146. See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AS PROJECTED BY CLARENCE M. LEWIS, THE CURSE
OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934)
(discussing capitalism and the concentration of economic power); MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE
DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920,
xiv (2003) (discussing the Progressive Era at the dawn of the twentieth century).
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consider themselves operating, for instance, in the tradition of Adam
Smith, who invoked “progress” as a way of understanding gains from
trade—what he calls the “progress of opulence.”147 It is as a consequence
of its multiple meanings that George Orwell famously wrote, “[w]ords of
this kind [of which he included the word ‘progressive’] are often used in
a consciously dishonest way.”148 What has emerged is a governmental
strategy that consciously appropriates the terminology of the opposing
side. It is designed to steer discussions in directions that build legitimacy
anew.
III. ARBITRAL STRATEGIES
Arbitrators, like high court judges, operate strategically within their
specific institutional environments.149 Political scientist Walter Murphy
laid the foundations for this genre of positivistic political science that is
helpful in decoding arbitral behavior. Murphy described “complex
judicial systems” within which judges operate that compel those who act
rationally—who strive to achieve their policy objectives—to “weigh a
number of factors in addition to the specific legal issues in individual
cases.”150 Judicial output is determined, in other words, partly by factors
external to what we ordinarily label “law.”151 Their behavior is explained,
in part, by an institutional desire to build diffuse and secure specific
support. In such circumstances, courts will want to issue reasons that are
seemingly more legal than political, but which do not stray too far from
what is politically feasible.152 Arbitrators also can be expected to issue
decisions that anticipate responses from their various audiences that both
secure legal objectives and enhance their legitimacy. 153 We can expect

147. See generally 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 336 (1910) (analyzing how the accession of wealth results from the progress
of nations).
148. GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and English Language, in SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT AND
OTHER ESSAYS 77, 83 (1950) (mentioning the words “progressive,” “reactionary,” and
“bourgeois,” by way of example).
149. David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking
an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383, 403–07 (2010).
150. WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 199 (1964).
151. These factors include structural and cultural constraints. See Rogers M. Smith, Political
Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism” and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
89, 100 (1988) (discussing the influence of structural contexts and their impact on discretion).
152. TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 21–22 (2011) (explaining what
he calls the “politics-legitimacy paradox”).
153. Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decision-Making, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 34, 35–36 (Gregory A. Caldeira, R. Daniel Kelemen, & Keith
E. Whittington eds., 2008).
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these objectives, however, to occasionally be in tension. The resulting
trade-offs help to explain arbitral outcomes that seek to enhance
legitimacy, but rub against dominant trend lines.
A. Audience Effects
One strategic concern that likely factors into arbitral decisionmaking
is how state parties may react, particularly those powerful capitalexporting states that help set the agenda for investment law as the regime
moves forward. I am thinking here, principally, of the U.S. Congress. The
outcome in the Loewen dispute is difficult to explain without reference to
the fact that the American judicial system was under scrutiny and that an
adverse decision would result in blowback from Congress. 154 This is
what the respondent appointee, Judge Abner Mikva, advised a law school
audience: If the U.S. lost Loewen, it could lose NAFTA.155 Mikva may
have parlayed these concerns to his fellow panelists because they were,
he informs us, intent on finding for Loewen.156 The tribunal consequently
went out of its way to incorporate the customary international law rule of
“continuous national[ity]” so as to preclude taking jurisdiction in the
Loewen dispute.157 As if aiming to describe the mechanics of strategic
decisionmaking, Noah Rubins characterizes the Loewen ruling as one in
which “the arbitrators had broader concerns in mind than the resolution
of the dispute before them.”158
Similar influences may have been at play in the Methanex ruling.159
Methanex is another case in which the United States was the respondent
and where the tribunal, rubbing against dominant trend lines, appeared to
describe the threshold for expropriation in exceptionally narrow terms.
154. See generally The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, (June 26, 2003) (concluding that the NAFTA
claims should be dismissed). For more discussion see Schneiderman, supra note 149, at 404–05.
155. Judge Abner Mikva, Audio tape: Symposium on Environmental Law and the Judiciary,
Pace Law School (Dec. 6–8, 2004) (on file with author).
156. Id.
157. Loewen, ARB(AF)/98/3, ¶ 225.
158. Noah Rubins, Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-State Arbitration Claim,
21 ARB. INT’L 1, 2 (2005). Noting that the ruling has been subject to “intense scrutiny and
criticism,” McLachlan, Shore, and Weinigar describe the Loewen tribunal’s discussion of
continuous nationality as “too strict and unsupported” in CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE
SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE
PRINCIPLES 153–54 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2007).
159. See generally In the Matter of an International Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Methanex Corporation v.
United States of America), Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, (Aug. 2005) (concluding that
the tribunal had no jurisdiction and that the Claimant’s claims should also be dismissed on the
merits).
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These will typically require, the tribunal declared, an “intentionally
discriminatory regulation,” in which case, non-discriminatory regulations
for a public purpose typically will not qualify unless “specific
commitments” have been made by the regulating authority and
communicated to the investor.160 As the result diverged from extant case
law, Methanex was denounced by leading scholars in the field and was
not followed in subsequent tribunal decisionmaking.161 The tribunal also
applied an exceptionally narrow understanding of NAFTA’s “in like
circumstances” requirement in determining whether there had been a
violation of national treatment.162 The comparator for the purposes of
discrimination analysis is “domestically owned” investments that will be
like the claimant “in all relevant respects, but for nationality.”163 This
resulted in the Methanex tribunal comparing the claimant’s treatment
with that of a non-competitor that produced methanol, but not for use as
a gasoline additive, a use that was banned by the State of California and
which gave rise to the NAFTA claim.164 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph
Schreuer, for this reason, caution against tribunals behaving as they did
in Methanex by casting the net of comparison “too narrowly.”165
The outcomes in both disputes indicate that something more than mere
“application” of the law was at play. We might better understand these
two disputes as producing outcomes partial to U.S. interests and more
congenial to views held by congressional leadership. They were less
likely, in other words, to attract blowback.
We might consider other high-profile disputes, such as those
concerning regulation of tobacco product advertising, in a similar light—
as the product of strategic decisionmaking. On those occasions where
states, journalists, and NGOs are focused on disputes that seek to reverse
a highly valued public policy choice, one expects tribunals to have their
gaze fixed not solely on the claimant or the respondent state, but also on
a much larger—one could even say global—audience. It is for this
audience, perhaps, that the tribunal in Phillip Morris v. Uruguay—a
dispute challenging Uruguay’s tobacco advertising policy—drew out
what it described as “a consistent trend in favor of differentiating”
160. Id. at Part IV, Chapter D, ¶ 7.
161. Kyla Tienhaara & Todd Tucker, Regulating Foreign Investment: Methanex Revisited, in
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH 255, 258, 288 (C. L. Lim ed., 2016).
162. Methanex, Part IV, Chapter B, ¶¶ 14–16.
163. Id.
164. Id. at ¶¶ 18–24.
165. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 180 (2008); Kurtz, supra note 20, at 278.
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between expropriations and exercises of police power authority. 166 This
is somewhat misleading, as in only one prior case was the state absolved
from responsibility because it exercised its police powers. 167 It is more
accurate to say, as the Phillip Morris tribunal also admitted, that the
distinction between compensable expropriations and non-compensable
exercises of police powers “did not find immediate recognition in
investment treaty decisions.”168
Tribunals have used other techniques with the apparent objective of
bringing more legitimacy to their decisionmaking functions. We can view
the introduction of the Salini criteria and the criterion of “contribution to
host state economic development,” in particular, as aiming to shrink the
legitimacy gap. If interest in promoting economic development was
intended to guide tribunals whether to accept jurisdiction under the ICSID
Convention,169 the concern was a fleeting one. Tribunals appear to have
since abandoned this criterion.170 As an interpretive matter, it is said that
giving primacy to economic development disregards “the actual text of
the ICSID Convention and . . . the ordinary meaning of the term
‘investment’ as employed in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.”171
One would have thought that contribution to host state economic
development would not be a problem in run-of-the-mill disputes.
Nevertheless, it has proven to be sufficiently troublesome to the
investment arbitration bar to require abandonment of Salini.
Conveniently, the “emerging” consensus appears to be settling upon a
narrow formula proffered by Zachary Douglas, requiring a “commitment
of resources to the economy of the host state . . . entailing the assumption

166. Philip Morris Brands Sárl, Philip Morris Products S.A. & Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 295 (July 8, 2016).
167. Ad Hoc NAFTA Arbitration Under UNCITRAL Rules (Chemtura Corporation v.
Government of Canada), Award, ¶ 266 (Aug. 2010).
168. Phillip Morris, ARB/10/7 ¶ 295.
169. Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (interpreting The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 524 (1965) [ICSID Convention]). An ICSID Annulment Committee declared this to be a
faulty reading of the ICSID Convention in Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. The
Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for
Annulment, ¶¶ 56–82 (Apr. 16, 2009).
170. E.g., Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 36 (July 30, 2009) (abandoning the Salini criteria); CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 900–04 (2d ed. 2009).
171. Roberto Castro de Figueiredo, The Notion of Investment and Economic Development under
the ICSID Convention, in ICSID CONVENTION AFTER 50 YEARS: UNSETTLED ISSUES 75, 130
(Crina Baltag ed., 2017).
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of risk in expectation of a commercial return.”172 Similar legitimacy
concerns also drove the presiding arbitrator in Tokios, Proper Weil, to
issue an unusual dissenting opinion. Weil opposed jurisdiction on the
grounds that setting up a shell company abroad in order to channel funds
originating out of the host state back into it (“round tripping”)
disqualified the investor from pursuing a claim under the ICSID
Convention.173 Adopting a realistic, rather than a formalistic, view of
nationality, Weil was of the view that only genuinely cross-border
investment qualified under ICSID. Deciding otherwise, he wrote, “put the
extraordinary success met by ICSID at risk.”174 Not surprisingly,
subsequent tribunals have not endorsed Weil’s approach and, instead,
have preferred to accept jurisdiction.175
It looks like investment arbitrators have pretty much given up on
having investment law play a meaningful role in host state economic
development. After all, as a meta-analysis of existing empirical evidence
on the correlation between signing BITs and attracting foreign direct
investment (“FDI”) suggests, the effects appear to be “economically
negligible.”176 No better result emerges in a sample of twelve states: BITs
do not attract “development-enhancing FDI,” the authors of the study
conclude.177 This is underscored by UNCTAD’s finding that an annual
“investment gap” of $2.5 trillion remains to be filled in order for
developing countries to meet development goals set out in its 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.178 As the promise of economic
development via new inward investment appears not to have
materialized, and so offers a weak foundation for the regime’s strictures,
172. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 189 (2009)
adopted approvingly by arbitrator Jan Paulsson in Pantechniki, ARB/07/21 ¶ 36.
173. Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr.
29, 2004); Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 23 (Apr.
29, 2004).
174. Tokelės, ARB/02/18 Dissenting Opinion ¶ 30.
175. Matei Purice, Natural Persons as Claimants Under the ICSID Convention, in ICSID
CONVENTION AFTER 50 YEARS: UNSETTLED ISSUES 131, 158 (Crina Baltag ed., 2017).
176. Christian Bellak, Economic Impact of Investment Agreements 19 (Vienna Univ. of Econs.
and Bus., Working Paper No. 200, 2015), https://epub.wu.ac.at/4625/1/wp200.pdf.
177. Liesbeth Colen & Andrea Guariso, What Type of Foreign Direct Investment is Attracted
by Bilateral Investment Treaties?, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 138, 156 (Olivier De
Schutter, Johan Swinnen & Jan Wouters eds., 2013) (discussing a study of twelve Central and
Eastern European states that challenge “the idea that BITs are a desirable policy tool to enhance
development”).
178. Press Release, Developing Countries Face $2.5 Trillion Annual Investment Gap in Key
Sustainable Development Sectors, UNCTAD Report Estimates, U.N. Press Release (June 24,
2014), http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressRelease.aspx?OriginalVersionID=194.
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other rationales to bolster legitimacy need to be sought out.
B. Third Parties
I turn now to an institutional response inaugurated by investment
tribunals, at the prompting of NGOs, which has subsequently been taken
up by states and selected arbitration facilities. The object is to augment
the participation of third parties in arbitration proceedings and to, thereby,
enhance the legitimacy of investment arbitration. As the Biwater Gauff
tribunal acknowledged, third-party participation assists “in securing
wider confidence in the arbitral process itself.”179 Following upon
innovations by the tribunals in Methanex and UPS,180 the NAFTA states
confirmed in 2003 that tribunals have full discretion to receive written
submissions from third parties.181 ICSID Arbitration rules, amended in
2006, enable the filing of third-party submissions and attendance at
hearings.182 The former are permitted after consultation with the parties;
the latter only with consent of the parties.183 No ICSID tribunal has yet
acceded to a request to attend or make oral submissions at a hearing.184
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investment Arbitration, in force
as of 2014, expand transparency and also enable third-party submissions
at the discretion of tribunals.185
179. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 50 (Feb. 2, 2007). See Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. & Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as
Amicus Curiae, ¶ 22 (May 19, 2005) (“Through the participation of appropriate representatives of
civil society in appropriate cases, the public will gain increased understanding of ICSID
processes.”).
180. United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (Oct. 17,
2001); In the Matter of an Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Methanex Corp. v. United States of America),
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae” (Jan.
2001).
181. Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation (Oct. 7,
2003), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf.
182. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Rule 37(2) (Apr. 2006).
183. Id. at Rule 37(2), 32(2). The 2004 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States
Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”) mandates access to documents and open hearings. The
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.21(1)–(2), Aug.
5, 2004.
184. See BENJAMIN MILLER ET AL., GUIDE FOR POTENTIAL AMICI IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
15
(Renu
Mandhane
et
al.
eds.,
2014),
http://ciel.org/Publications/Guide_PotentialAmici_Jan2014.pdf.
185. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL RULES ON
TRANSPARENCY
IN
TREATY-BASED
INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
6
(2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
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So, while there has been increasing openness among the NAFTA
parties—even live online streaming of some hearings 186—there is still a
chasm between aspiration and reality. 187 Pre-award transparency, for
instance, is hardly available in ICSID and UNCITRAL tribunal
practice.188 Investors, it seems, typically oppose third-party
interventions. Not only are interveners more likely to favor respondent
states, they will also boost the already significant costs associated with
investment arbitration.189 There is also an ancillary fear that third-party
interventions will contribute to the “repoliticization” of investment
disputes. Investment arbitration, it is said, has already secured its
“depoliticization.”190 Enabling third parties, it is feared, will undo this
achievement. There are two versions to this claim. 191 The first, more
modest, one is that investment arbitration has removed disputes from
home state control.192 Now that disputes are in the hands of investors,
home states no longer determine whether investment claims get
launched.193 The second, more extravagant, version is that disputes are
now resolved without reference to politics.194 As the political element has

Transparency-E.pdf.
186. E.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Award, ¶ 1.23, 1.35 (Oct. 14, 2016) (referring to live-stream in English and Spanish on ICSID’s
website).
187. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration
through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681, 723 (2007). This
contrasts with post-award transparency, which is better, as noted by Federico Ortino, Transparency
of Investment Awards, in TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 119, 135 (Junji Nakagawa ed., 2013).
188. Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in
Investment Arbitration?, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITY 253, 267 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Avidan Kent, The Principle of Public
Participation in ICSID Arbitrations, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE
DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 554, 575 (Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger with H.E. Judge C.G. Weeramantry eds., 2017).
189. In the Matter of an Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Methanex Corp. v. United States of America),
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶ 50 (Jan.
15) (stating that submissions may “add significantly to the overall cost of the arbitration”); see
Noah Rubins, Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for What Benefit?, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (ICSID):
TAKING STOCK AFTER 40 YEARS 213, 219–22 (Rainer Hofmann & Christian J. Tams eds., 2007)
(going so far as to propose that intervenors pay for the privilege of making amicus submissions).
190. Tomoko Ishikawa, Third Party Participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 373, 399–401 (2010).
191. Schneiderman, supra note 99, at 693–94.
192. Id. at 696.
193. Id. at 699.
194. Id. at 708.
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been removed from economic disputes, writes Noah Rubins, investment
arbitrators now have recourse only to “principle.”195 It appears to be this
second, extravagant, version that is in circulation when it comes to third
parties. Those promoting it are in denial, however, about the close
linkages between law and politics in investment arbitration.196 It simply
is not credible to claim that investment arbitration is emptied of politics
or that an investment dispute has not already significantly heightened the
political stakes involved.
Although investment tribunals have accepted amicus interventions,
they appear to have done so with some reluctance. This is exemplified by
the behavior of the Biwater Gauff tribunal. The dispute arose over a failed
water concession in Tanzania. The tribunal accepted the investor’s claims
that Tanzania had been leaking arbitration documents to NGOs which, in
turn, conscripted them in their public campaign against the investor.197
In an interim order, the tribunal ruled that the proceedings would remain
closed to the public until release of the tribunal’s final award.198 This had
the effect of barring disclosure of discussions or documents to any third
parties.199 It is noteworthy that the investor itself had used ads and press
releases to advance its own cause in the arena of public opinion.200 The
tribunal accepted, nevertheless, that:
[P]rosecution of a dispute in the media or in other public fora . . . may
aggravate or exacerbate the dispute and may impact upon the integrity
of the procedure. This is all the more so in very public cases, such as
this one, where issues of wider interest are raised, and where there is
already substantial media coverage, some of which already being the
subject of complaint by the parties [sic].201

Publicity, in other words, gave rise to a “sufficient risk of harm or
prejudice [to the integrity of the proceedings], as well as aggravation [of

195. Blackaby & Richard, supra note 188, at 273; Rubins, supra note 189, at 218.
196. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining how investment arbitrators have given up on
using investment law to play a substantial role in host state economic development); David
Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: Return to the Standards of Civilised Justice?,
in 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 60, 76 (2014).
197. The campaign was launched under the banner “Dirty aid, dirty water. Hands off Tanzania:
Stop UK company Biwater’s attempt to sue.” Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, ¶ 16 (Sept. 29, 2006) (describing
the purpose to discontinue the present ICSID proceedings); SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 95, at 62–
70 (discussing the Biwater Gauff dispute).
198. Biwater Gauff, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, at ¶ 142.
199. Id. at ¶¶ 128–130.
200. Id. at ¶ 41.
201. Id. at ¶ 136.
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the dispute], in this case to warrant some form of control.”202 In order to
stop the company’s reputational bleeding, the tribunal sought to stifle
further public discussion about a claim concerning a critical public
resource for which Tanzania was on the hook for USD $20 million. The
order of confidentiality had the pernicious effect of undermining
participation in the dispute by third parties. The tribunal subsequently
granted standing to a group of five environmental NGOs to file an amicus
brief in the dispute pursuant to Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules of
Procedure. They could not gain access, however, to any of the arguments
either side would be making in the case.203 This severely hampered their
ability to contribute to the tribunal’s resolution of the dispute.204 In the
final award, the tribunal acknowledged that the amicus brief provided a
“very useful initial context” for the tribunal’s inquiry and reiterated that
the brief was “useful” and “informed” in its analysis.205 Even though the
brief was declared to be “useful,” the tribunal declined to follow the amici
on any of the points made in their brief. They appear, consequently, to
have done little to influence the tribunal’s reasoning. 206 Third parties
have played a similarly marginal role in the few other instances where
their submissions have been received.207 Even if one accepts that thirdparty participation is now “firmly entrenched” in investment arbitration,
legitimacy hardly has been enhanced.208

202. Id. at ¶ 146.
203. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 68 (Feb. 2, 2007).
204. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Transparency and Amicus Curiae in ICSID
Arbitrations, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 191, 205 (MarieClaire Cordonier Segger et al. eds., 2011) (describing how amici could now determine the area of
focus that would most benefit the tribunal); Fiona Marshall, The Precarious State of Sunshine: Case
Comment on Procedural Orders in the Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania Investor-State
Arbitration, 3 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 181, 185 (2007) (discussing how
petitioners may file a written submission, but it would be without seeing the pleadings or other
documents first).
205. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 355, 392 (July 24, 2008).
206. For more encouraging accounts, see Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 204, at 206;
Nathalie Bernasconi et al., Civil Society and International Investment Arbitration: Tracing the
Evolution of Concern, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 8 (Federico
Ortino & Thomas Schultz eds., forthcoming); Christina Knahr, The New Rules for Participation of
Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID Arbitration: Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT
TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 319, 327 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
207. Wei-Chung Lin, Safeguarding the Environment? The Effectiveness of Amicus Curiae
Submissions in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 270, 300 (2017).
208. Blackaby & Richard, supra note 188, at 270.
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C. Proportionality
Yet another legitimization strategy that is being selectively adopted by
tribunals, mostly at the urging of a number of academic commentators, is
to have recourse to a ubiquitous methodology for resolving constitutional
disputes, namely, proportionality.209 A focus on means-ends scrutiny is
described as a “tailor-made solution”210 for investment arbitrators as a
means of enhancing the “legitimacy of rule-governed legal institutions
that undertake it.”211 These scholars advocate the “rapid adoption of
proportionality analysis as a standard technique.”212 What better means
for resolving legitimacy problems than to appropriate techniques that
apex courts around the world have found useful in resolving contentious
constitutional controversies?
On those occasions where tribunals have sought to adopt
proportionality’s methods, however, they have not performed so well.213
As Erlend Leonhardsen observes, tribunals have exhibited some
confusion about how proportionality analysis functions. They have
collapsed the requisite steps associated with the inquiry (suitability,
necessity, proportionate effect) and have exhibited confusion by applying
its methods in determining whether a treaty breach has occurred rather
than in the context of determining whether a deprivation of rights can be
justified.214 The Tecmed tribunal decision is often singled out as having
exhibited good technique, but it stumbles precisely upon these points.
Jansen Calamita, for this reason, describes the Tecmed tribunal’s
discussion of proportionality as amounting to a “[r]hetorical flourish[]
about deference” rather than its “actual application.”215 Significant

209. Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and Global
Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 75 (2008).
210. Id. at 89.
211. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in EL NUEVO
DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO GLOBAL EN AMÉRICA LATINA: DESAFÍOS PARA LAS INVERSIONES
EXTRANJERAS, LA REGULACIÓN NACIONAL Y EL FINANCIAMIENTO PARA EL DESARROLLO 221, 276
(Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds., 2009).
212. Id.
213. For more on proportionality as legitimation strategy in investment arbitration, see David
Schneiderman, Global Constitutionalism and its Legitimacy Problems: Human Rights,
Proportionality, and International Investment Law, in LAW AND ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(forthcoming 2018).
214. Erlend M. Leonhardsen, Looking for Legitimacy: Exploring Proportionality Analysis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 95, 124 (2012).
215. N. Jansen Calamita, The Principle of Proportionality and the Problem of Indeterminacy in
International Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
POLICY 2013–2014 157, 187 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2015) (emphasis in original).
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learning will have to occur if tribunals are to begin adopting
proportionality as a device both for determining the propriety of a state
measure and for overcoming legitimization problems.
There is little reason to believe, however, that this strategy will take
hold, despite the best advice of some scholars. This is because, as José
Alvarez argues, a proportionality inquiry is hardly defensible in the face
of obligations, like expropriation, that amount to something like strict
liability.216 The proposal, moreover, disregards already existing
limitations “built-into” existing standards of protection. The weighing
between ends and means is “an inescapable part” of the substance of
treaty obligations, Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi write.217 There is little
logic to supplementing such analyses with an additional layer of meansends scrutiny. A complementary state strategy, the inclusion of “right to
regulate” clauses as general exceptions in investment treaties,218 give rise
to similar objections. How might these clauses work to convince
arbitrators to yield more policy space to states when arbitrators already
take into account the right to regulate when interpreting substantive treaty
obligations, it is asked.219 Arbitrators, as argued above, are attentive to
these audience effects and act strategically so as to yield this ground to
states without, at the same time, diluting treaty standards of protection.220
Proportionality may still emerge as a constituent element of investment
arbitration because of European agreements such as CETA and the EUVietnam FTA Annex on expropriation. Section Three of CETA, for
instance, declares that indirect expropriations are unlikely to arise except
when, among other factors, “an impact of a measure or series of measures
is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive.”221
216. José E. Alvarez, Beware Border Crossings, in BOUNDARIES OF STATE, BOUNDARIES OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVATE ACTORS AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 62–64 (Tsvi Kahana &
Anat Scolnicov eds., 2016).
217. José E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A
Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW & POLICY 2008–2009 449 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
218. Suggested in UNCTAD’s roadmap for IIA Reform in United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy, 126 (2017)
[hereinafter UNCTAD].
219. This is the position taken by Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International
Investment Agreements, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 355
(Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W. Gehring, and Andrew Newcombe eds., 2011).
Newcombe also argues that these clauses may have the unintended effect of “limiting the range of
legitimate objectives available to the state.” Id. at 358.
220. The strategy, as declared by UNCTAD, is about “safeguarding the right to regulate, while
providing protection.” UNCTAD, supra note 218, at 119.
221. EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Annex: Expropriation ¶ 3, Jan. 2016:
For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstances where the impact of a measure or
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Similar language is found in the EU-Vietnam agreement. Such textual
directives might have the effect of leading arbitrators, exclusively in the
context of determining whether an indirect expropriation has taken place,
to apply a rigorous proportionality analysis. How well they perform this
function remains an open question. Such explicit treaty language could
also have the indirect effect of precluding arbitrators from applying a
proportionality analysis when considering other standards of treatment.
While proportionality is held out as a magic bullet to secure legitimacy,
it is unevenly available and clumsily applied. It also turns out to be a
legitimization strategy directed almost exclusively at an expert audience
of investment lawyers, arbitrators, and NGOs.
D. Global Administrative Law
This last strategy is not one that tribunals have referred to expressly;
rather, it emerges implicitly out of arbitral practice. I am referring to the
“embryonic” field of global administrative law (“GAL”)—a scholarly
movement originating out of New York University Law School that has
taken on global dimensions. The object is to lay down standards
worldwide regarding “transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and
legality” and, in addition, “provid[e] effective review of . . . rules and
decisions.”222 Its ambition is to establish global norms and institutions
that will “fulfill functions at least somewhat comparable to those
administrative law fulfills domestically.”223 In its various guises, GAL is
expected to “capture the nucleus of what inexorably will become a
sophisticated, robust, and well-established field of law.”224 Investment
arbitration, it is said, is a good example of global administrative law at
work: a “functionally integrated system of norms that regulates national
administrative decision-making.”225
Investment arbitrators have most evidently adopted a strategy of
series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive,
non-discriminatory measures or series of measures by a Party that are designed to protect
legitimate public policy objectives do not constitute indirect expropriation.
222. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 15, 17 (2005).
223. Id. at 28.
224. EYAL BENVENISTI, HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L LAW, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
287 (2014). See also Lorenzo Casini, Global Administrative Law Scholarship, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 548, 567 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2016) (discussing
how GAL and its scholarship will flourish if it frames problems and raises questions).
225. Richard B. Stewart, Global Standards for National Societies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 175, 189 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2016); see also Gus Van Harten
& Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17
EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 149 (2006) (discussing how investment arbitration is a carrier of GAL values).
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promoting the rules and institutions associated with domestic
administrative law when considering fair and equitable treatment
(“FET”), a treaty standard of protection increasingly central to the
business of investment arbitration. The Tecmed tribunal, for instance,
enumerated behavior expected of states under FET: transparency,
consistency, uniformity, and predictability.226 Similarly, the Waste
Management tribunal described the minimum standard of treatment as
encompassing “manifest failure of natural justice.”227 This is what
Thomas Wälde and Stephen Dow refer to when they speak of “good
governance”228 and what arbitrator Pedro Nikken refers to in Suez as the
“canons of a modern and well-organized State.”229 Though Nikken parts
company with his fellow tribunal members on the issue of whether
“legitimate expectations” doctrine falls within FET, he appears to have in
mind the behavior enumerated by Tecmed, and the standards associated
with GAL.
Some have singled out the Clayton tribunal as an example of the
direction in which investment arbitration might be heading. 230 Bilcon of
Delaware, owned and controlled by the Clayton family, succeeded in its
claim against Canada for having followed the advice of an independent
environmental review panel. Under review was a proposal by Bilcon to
build a rock quarry, together with a processing and ship-loading facility,
on sensitive Nova Scotia shoreline for export to the state of New Jersey.
A joint environmental review panel recommended to the Canadian and
Nova Scotia governments that they reject Bilcon’s proposal because of
its adverse environmental effects on land, marine, and human
environments.231 The tribunal found Canada liable, however, for having

226. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003).
227. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (No. 2) ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3,
Award, ¶ 94 (Apr. 30, 2004); see also Clayton v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 442 (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287
(discussing the influence of the Waste Management international minimum standard).
228. Thomas Wälde & Stephen Dow, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure
Investment, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 4, 13, 57 (2000).
229. Suez v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro
Nikken, ¶ 36 (July 30, 2010).
230. See Rob Howse, The Bilcon Decision: The Environment, Local Politics and the Rule of
Law, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 20, 2015, 10:11 PM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2015/03/the-bilcon-decision-the-environment-localpolitics-and-the-rule-of-law.html (arguing that investors are entitled to decisions based on “the law
in force as written,” and not on the basis of political machinations).
231. See JOINT REVIEW PANEL, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED WHITE POINTS QUARRY AND
MARINE
TERMINAL
PROJECT
4
(2007),
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relied upon the environmental panel’s allegedly faulty legal process.232
The joint review panel engaged in arbitrary behavior because it failed to
properly apply Canadian law, resulting in a violation of NAFTA’s
minimum standard of treatment, of which FET is an element.233
The panel was alleged to have been at fault for incorporating
something called “community core values” into its report. Doing so was
“inimical to the proponents having any real chance of success,”234 two
tribunal members concluded, resulting in “a serious breach of the law on
procedural fairness.”235 As the dissenting opinion of Donald McRae
emphasized, community core values served only as a label for “human
environmental effects.” It is as if, McRae complained, his fellow
arbitrators had not even bothered to read the panel’s report.236 Instead,
the tribunal majority appears to have accepted, without qualification, the
claimant’s arguments that community core values were the essential basis
of the panel’s decision.237 The tribunal coupled this finding with a
seemingly redundant discussion of legitimate expectations doctrine.238
The investor, after all, believed that local law would be properly applied.
It was this legitimate expectation—present in most every investment
dispute—that was upended.
Reminiscent of the GAL approach, the Clayton tribunal purported not
to predetermine policy outcomes. It instead was focused on the question
of whether decisions, having the effect of diminishing investment returns,
were the product of fair processes. Numerous problems, however, arise
even when applying this more modest standard of review. First, it is not
beyond question that the joint review panel misapplied Canadian law.239
www.novascotia.ca/nse/ea/whitespointquarry/WhitesPointQuarryFinalReport.pdf [hereinafter JRP
Report] (summarizing the panel’s recommendations to the Government of Canada).
232. See Clayton v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 742
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1287 (finding by a majority vote that
Canada was liable for the breach of its obligations under NAFTA Articles 1105 and 1102).
233. Id. at ¶ 548.
234. Id. at ¶ 450.
235. Id. at ¶ 534.
236. Clayton v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald
McRae, ¶ 14 (Mar. 10, 2015). Apart from the report summary, the first reference to human
environmental effects appears only after the section headed “Human Environment Effects
Assessment,” which is 66 pages into a 107-page-long report. See JRP Report, supra note 231, at
66. Further, “core values” received a three-page discussion immediately prior to the panel’s
“conclusions and recommendations” at the end of the report. See id. at 96.
237. Clayton, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 452.
238. See Matthew Levine, The Bilcon Case: Do Their Expectations Freeze Our (Environmental
Assessment) Frameworks? 14 (Apr. 19, 2017) (unpublished L.L.M paper, University of Toronto)
(discussing the legitimate expectations doctrine in relation to Article 1105).
239. Clayton, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, ¶ 36.
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The Federal Court of Canada might only have “potentially” been
interested in the claim, observed McRae. Second, it is extraordinary,
though not unprecedented, that a tribunal would find international
liability for what is arguably a breach of host state law.240 Third, and as
a consequence, the tribunal will have awarded damages in circumstances
where Canadian courts would not have done so. As dissenting arbitrator
McRae pointedly remarked, the ruling produced a “disturbing result,”
leading to a “remarkable step backwards in environmental protection.”241
If offered up as a good example of procedural review, the Clayton award
renders global administrative law a perilous strategy for securing
investment law’s legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has canvassed a number of strategies adopted by states
and arbitral tribunals to generate or boost the legitimacy of ISDS. Not one
of them turns out to be adequate. Some are even resisted by the system’s
principal agents, which only thwarts their efficacy. There are other
strategies, too, that might have been mentioned; for instance, conscription
of WTO appellate body jurisprudence242 or avoiding excessive damage
awards for fear that it would “imperil the legitimacy” of ISDS.243
However wide-ranging this discussion could have been, it is fair to
conclude that few strategies are being pursued vigorously or consistently,
and so success on any of these fronts is unlikely. No “technical fix” is
likely to solve this crisis.244 Nor is it likely that the system will
imminently collapse as a consequence. Rather, it is more likely that,
without much diffuse support, ISDS will recede from the headlines and
See generally Meinhard Doelle, The Bilcon NAFTA Tribunal: A Clash of Investor Protection and
Sustainability-based Environmental Assessment, KEY DEVS. IN ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3002626 (explaining how the joint review
panel ruling raised numerous concerns).
240. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 359 (3d ed.
2010) (discussing how tribunals are arguing that “all administrative irregularity should be regarded
as unfairness” under FET).
241. Clayton, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McRae, ¶ 51.
242. See, e.g., Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their
Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defence of Necessity, 28 ICSID
REV. 351 (2013) (discussing how the WTO jurisprudence was considered by the tribunal as an
alternative to the requirement of necessity under ordinary international law); see also JÜRGEN
KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONVERGING SYSTEMS 28 (2016)
(explaining the role of the WTO in investment arbitration).
243. Thomas W. Wälde, Remedies and Compensation in International Investment Law, 2
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 5, 7 (2005).
244. Lorenzo Cotula, Democracy and International Investment Law, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 351,
380 (2017).
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investment lawyers will go about doing their work until such time as the
next crisis erupts.
Even Guizot’s democracy-deprived account of legitimacy-byjustification that relies upon elite management is discordant with
investment arbitration. I have been describing a system, after all, that has
some difficulty generating transparency and promoting conditions for
contestability. It looks, in Beetham’s memorable phrasing, more “like an
extortion racket than a public service.”245 Even though institutional
efforts have been made—at ICSID, for instance—to enhance openness,
the regime continues to operate at unacceptable levels of secrecy: with
enigmatic initial claims, privileged memorials, confidential
proceedings,246 and certain undisclosed awards. These problems are
compounded by the field’s arcane discourse,247 lengthy opinions,
confidentiality of settlements, difficult-to-access scholarship and pricey
subscriptions to specialized news outlets. Access to information, in other
words, remains a problem.
Having disputes resolved within national legal systems would help to
alleviate some of these problems, but that is a goal that investment law’s
agents fiercely resist.248 Instead, investment lawyers and scholars have a
different end game in sight: having states everywhere internalize
investment law standards of treatment so that all economic actors within
host states benefit from investor protections, not just foreigners. 249 This
is an unrealistic, if dystopic, scenario. Even if such a consensus was
secured and an empire of homogeneity installed, it would never result in
stable outcomes. Disagreement about the proper relationship between
politics and markets is endemic—it will always engender disagreement,
particularly in an age of heightened economic inequality.250 The search
245. BEETHAM, supra note 53, at 83.
246. Even states have on occasion preferred that proceedings remain confidential. Int’l Council
for Commercial Arbitration, Survey: Arbitral Institutions Can do More to Foster legitimacy: True
or False, in LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES 667, 733 (Albert Jan Van den Berg
ed., 2015).
247. Investment arbitrators have not taken direction from more experienced communicators
such as Gowers, who writes that “even if your understanding and use of” Latin is “faultless[,] your
reader may be less learned than you and must not be made to feel inferior.” SIR ERNEST GOWERS,
THE COMPLETE PLAIN WORDS 73 (Sir Bruce Fraser rev’d., 1973).
248. The rationale for such a proposal, prompted by thoughts about the Latin maxim audi
alteram partem, is developed in Schneiderman, supra note 94.
249. Thomas W. Wälde, The Umbrella Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on
Original Intentions and Recent Cases, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 183, 188 (2005).
250. Sean Ennis et al., Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power (OECD, Working Paper No.
DAF/COMP(2015)10
Feb.
16,
2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2015)10/en/pdf.

2017]

International Investment Law

269

for a common good as a means of justifying relations of power will
always attract contestation and resistance. To believe otherwise is to be
unrealistic about the legal profession’s charismatic authority.
All of which speaks to the need to think creatively about routes to
legitimacy. It requires imagination and some experimentation, both of
which seem to be in short supply among the investment law set, including
those inhabiting government positions. New legitimation strategies need
to be devised in a Guizotian spirit. As Guizot’s modern interpreter puts
it, the task needs to be undertaken with the expectation that legitimacy
will never be definitively acquired, remains precarious, and will always
be open to challenge.251

251. ROSANVALLON, supra note 23, at 7.

